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WAIVER OF RIGHTS
DOL Topic: I 1
PART ONE OF THIS MEMORANDUM PROVIDES A SUMMARY OF
QUESTIONS ASKED AND COMMENTS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO THE
DOL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (“RFI”) ABOUT WAIVER OF FMLA
RIGHTS. 2
PART TWO OF THIS MEMORANDUM CONTAINS THE RELEVANT
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY TEXT. PART TWO ALSO LISTS OTHER
SOURCES CITED IN THE COMMENTS ABOUT THIS TOPIC.
PART ONE
The DOL has requested information regarding an employee’s waiver of FMLA
rights. Although the statute itself does not address whether waivers of FMLA rights are
enforceable, under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), an employee “cannot waive, nor may
employers induce employees to waive” their FMLA rights. Courts have interpreted this
regulation to prohibit employees both from waiving FMLA rights prospectively and from
signing waivers that release an employer from liability for existing FMLA claims.
The DOL solicited comments on whether the regulation should limit only the
waiver of prospective FMLA rights. 3

1

This topic is not discussed in depth in the Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the
Department of Labor's Request For Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35550 (June 28, 2007), available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/FMLA2007FederalRegisterNotice/07-3102.pdf.
2

The comments reviewed herein are from employers, employer organizations, employees, employee
organizations, health care providers, and health care provider organizations. They reflect all comments
posted on regulations.gov or available via a Google search as of May 8, 2007. More detailed descriptions
of these comments are found in the “Digest of Comments Submitted in Response to the Department of
Labor’s Request for Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act,” available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibility2010/law/fmla.cfm.
3

The question posed in the RFI was worded ambiguously. The RFI asked whether “a limitation should be
placed on the ability of employees to settle their past FMLA claims.” This could be read as asking
whether employees should have the right to engage in a full-fledged settlement and negotiation of their
FMLA claims, resulting in agreements that release the employer from liability. However, as the Taylor
case put forward by the DOL for comment makes clear, the question is the broader one of whether
employees should be permitted to waive all past FMLA claims in the context of agreements signed upon
termination, even without any awareness that they might have a valid FMLA claim.
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ISSUE: Employee Waiver of FMLA Rights
! The RFI asked: Should employees be able to waive past FMLA claims in
settlements with employers? The case cited in the RFI dealt with an employee’s
waiver of her FMLA rights in an agreement she signed upon her termination:
! Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated and
rehearing granted (June 14, 2006), opinion reinstated in Taylor v. Progress
Energy, Inc., No. 04-1525, 2007 WL 1893362 (4th Cir. July 3, 2007). [Note: when
the RFI was published, the Taylor case had been vacated and was pending
rehearing. The reinstated opinion was issued a few days following the release of
the DOL Report.]
In Taylor, an employee requested several times that her time off for medical
purposes be counted as FMLA leave. A human resources representative denied
her requests several times on the grounds that she had not been out of work for
more than five consecutive days.
The employee was ultimately terminated based on poor attendance. Upon being
notified of her termination, the employee signed a release and settlement
agreement, including a provision that released her employer from all state and
federal law claims. In return, she received $12,000 of severance pay.
The district court held that the employee’s waiver was valid. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) bars both the
prospective and retrospective waiver of substantive and proscriptive FMLA rights
without the prior approval of the DOL or a court. The court held that, in this
respect, the FMLA was similar to the FLSA and different from non-discrimination
laws such as Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA.
The company petitioned for rehearing en banc and the DOL filed an amicus brief
in support of rehearing. The panel vacated its decision and reheard the case in
order to take into account the interpretation by the agency of its own regulation.
Upon rehearing, a divided panel reinstated its opinion. Taylor v. Progress Energy,
Inc., No. 04-1525, 2007 WL 1893362 (4th Cir. July 3, 2007). The majority
rejected the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation as prohibiting the waiver
only of prospective claims as inconsistent with the plain language of the
regulation. The dissenting judge concluded the regulation was ambiguous and
would have given the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation deference.
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EMPLOYER-SIDE COMMENTS
The bullets below encapsulate the few employer-side comments on this topic.
"

Employers express the view that § 825.220(d) should prohibit only prospective waivers.
Employers note that the text of the regulation does not bar both retrospective and
prospective waivers of employees’ FMLA rights. Employers state that public policy
favors settlement by providing an incentive for employers to correct any existing (or
alleged) FMLA violations, and that the regulations should not be read in a manner that
is inconsistent with this important public policy. Further, employers object to the
promulgation of any regulations requiring employees to obtain prior approval from a
court or the DOL before settling their claims. Employers state that imposing such
requirements will ratchet up the cost of settlements, and discourage employers from
reaching settlements with employees who have valid claims, resulting in increased
litigation costs, and delaying claim resolution.

"

Employers state that employees should be able to waive their rights to future litigation
in exchange for a settlement of claims arising before the waiver agreement. Employers
observe that, as is true in the settlement of ADEA claims, employees have the
opportunity to obtain legal advice before entering any such agreement.

"

Suggested Change: Revise § 825.220(d) to permit employees to sign waiver
agreements that prevent them from bringing litigation over past FMLA claims.

EMPLOYEE-SIDE COMMENTS
The bullets below encapsulate the few employee-side comments on this issue.
"

Employee organizations state that § 825.220(d) prohibits both prospective and
retroactive waivers. Employee organizations also observe that the regulation does not
distinguish between the two.

"

Employee organizations express the view that employees must be able to fully
vindicate their rights under the FMLA. The AFL-CIO notes that the general release in
Taylor allowed the employer to insulate itself from liability for multiple FMLA violations
by obtaining a release that did not notify Taylor that she was “abandoning her FMLA
claims.” The AFL-CIO believes this reflects the need for a prohibition on retroactive
waivers because such a release is at odds with congressional intent to permit a private
right of action for FMLA claims.
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EMPLOYEE-SIDE COMMENTS
"

Employee organizations note that parts of the FMLA were modeled on the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), which permits only court or DOL-approved waivers. Employee
organizations state that Taylor’s decision to apply the same approval requirements to
FMLA waivers as those that are applied to FLSA waivers was correct.
o The AFL-CIO notes that Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945)
involved waivers under the FLSA. In O’Neil, an employee was offered a check
for withheld overtime compensation in exchange for a release of any FLSA
claims. The employee later sued for liquidated damages under the FLSA, and
the Supreme Court held that his waiver was invalid as an employee cannot
waive his rights under the FLSA. Employee groups suggest that the same nowaiver rule should be applied to any employee settlement waivers under the
FMLA.
o Employee organizations note that the FLSA also rejects private settlements, but
allows the DOL to approve settlements. This policy position is what led the
Taylor court to hold that § 825.220(d) bars a waiver of both substantive and
proscriptive FMLA rights without the prior approval of the DOL or a court.
o The Partnership’s suggested course of action: Conduct “a separate discussion
with all stakeholders to explore ways to appropriately resolve complaints and
ensure that employees retain their FMLA rights.”
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PART TWO
THE APPLICABLE REGULATORY PROVISION RELATED TO TOPIC I HAS BEEN EXCERPTED BELOW.
REGULATION
29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d)
Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under FMLA. For example,
employees (or their collective bargaining representatives) cannot "trade off" the right to take FMLA leave against some
other benefit offered by the employer . . . .
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MATERIALS CITED IN COMMENTS RESPONDING TO THE RFI4
Cases
"

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

"

D.A. Shulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946).

"

Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945).

"

Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003).

"

Sloop v. ABTCO, Inc., 178 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1999).

"

Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. U.S., 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982).

"

Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. U.S., No. 05-2336, 2006 WL 2529632 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006).

"

Conway v. Stryker Med. Div., No. 4:05-CV-40, 2006 WL 1008670 (W.D. Mich. April 18,
2006).

"

Dierlam v. Wesley Jessen Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

"

Bluitt v. Eval Co. of Am., 3 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Tex. 1998).

4

Cases and materials cited in the RFI are excluded from this list. This list does not include surveys cited
in reviewed comments.
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